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Articles
Prisoners’ Fundamental Right to
Read: Courts Should Ensure that
Rational Basis is Truly Rational
Alicia Bianco*
INTRODUCTION

The United States contains only five percent of the world’s
population, but is home to twenty-five percent of the world’s
prisoners.1 The incarceration rate is approximately one in every
one hundred American adults,2 and all of those incarcerated in
America are victims of censorship.3 American prisons prevent
* Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law, 2015; B.A. in
International Service, American University, 2011.
1. See Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAT’L ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF COLORED PEOPLE, http://www.naacp.org/pages/criminal-justice-fact-sheet
(last visited Oct. 5, 2015); The Cost of a Nation of Incarceration, CBS NEWS
(Apr. 23, 2012, 5:15 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3445_162-57418495/
the-cost-of-a-nation-of-incarceration/ (“[W]e incarcerate a greater percentage
of our population than any country on Earth.” (quoting statement of Michael
Jacobson, Director, Vera Institute of Justice)).
2. Adam Liptak, 1 in 100 U.S. Adults Behind Bars, New Study Says,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/28/us/28cndprison.html; Robert E. Rubin & Nicholas Turner, The Steep Cost of America’s
High Incarceration Rate, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 25, 2014, 4:36 PM), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/robert-rubin-and-nicholas-turner-the-steep-cost-ofamericas-high-incarceration-rate-1419543410.
3. Prisoners challenge prison conditions and regulations as violating
their constitutional rights. For example, prisoners often allege violations of
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prisoners from accessing a variety of publications by refusing to
order certain publications and, even more chillingly, by preventing
prisoners from receiving intended publications.4 Publishers rarely
challenge prison censorship policies, despite having standing to do
so,5 because, for most publishers, prisoners do not make a
“sufficiently marketable demographic” to justify challenging the
prison regulations in court.6
Commentator Andrea Jones
acknowledges this phenomenon in her discussions on prison
censorship.7 In one particular instance, she notes that, although
both publishers and prisoners have standing to challenge
censorship policies within prisons, in practice publishers “rarely
act upon notice that the material they’ve mailed has been seized
or withheld.”8
Censorship in prisons poses a threat to prisoners’ First
Amendment rights.9
When censorship violates the First
Amendment rights of the un-incarcerated, the Supreme Court
vigorously protects First Amendment rights.10 Yet, courts do not
protect prisoners’ First Amendment rights to the same degree.

their Eighth Amendment rights. See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4
(1992); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296–99 (1991); Whitley v. Albers, 475
U.S. 312, 314 (1986). However, the subject of this Comment is focused solely
on the infringement of prisoners’ First Amendment rights by censorship of
publications.
4. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 549–50 (1979).
5. See Hrdlicka v. Reniff, 631 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2011)
(“[P]ublishers and inmates have a First Amendment interest in
communicating with each other.”).
6. Andrea Jones, Battling Censorship Behind Bars: How Prisons and
Jails Are Barring Inmates’ Access to Legal News, Literature and Letters,
SALON (May 7, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://www.salon.com/2013/05/07/battling_
censorship_behind_bars_partner/.
7. See id.
8. Id.
9. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Jones, supra note 6.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813,
827 (2000) (holding that Playboy’s programming has First Amendment
protection and stating that a content-based regulation “can stand only if it
satisfies strict scrutiny”); see also Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 128 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“I would recognize this opportunity to confirm our past holdings
and to rule that the New York statute amounts to raw censorship based on
content, censorship forbidden by the text of the First Amendment and wellsettled principles protecting speech and the press. That ought to end the
matter.”).

BIANCO_FINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

PRISONERS’ RIGHT TO READ

2/18/2016 12:38 PM

3

The courts, relying on Turner v. Safley,11 have continuously
deferred to the legislature and prison administrators when
considering the validity of prison policies that threaten prisoners’
First Amendment rights. In essence, this deference leads to
courts applying an extremely lenient form of rational basis
review.12 However, the plain meaning of Turner calls for a
balancing test.13 This deference is inappropriate in relation to
prisoners’ reading rights because of the importance of the right at
issue.14
In addition, the current standard of review is
inappropriate because prisoners face excessive anti-inmate
animus and political powerlessness.15 In order to adequately
protect the rights of prisoners and correctly apply the Turner test,
the courts should be more discerning and use a form of heightened
review. Prisoners should be allotted a heightened version of
rational basis review in order to protect their constitutional rights.
This Article examines the censorship that currently exists in
prisons and the standard of review that courts apply to prisoners’
First Amendment challenges to prison censorship policies.
Further, this Article contends that the deference the courts have
historically given, and still give, to prison administrators’ policies
is inappropriate—suggesting that prisoners’ right to read is
precisely the type of right that should be subject to a stricter
version of rational basis review, often colloquially called “rational
basis with a bite.”16
Part I of this Article examines the current realities prisoners

11. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
12. See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 522–23 (2006); see also infra
Part II.
13. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–91; see also infra Part II.
14. See infra Section III.B.
15. See infra Section III.A.
16. The Court has never called “rational basis with a bite” by that name.
The Court has only referred to the test by its traditional name, rational basis
review. When I state that the Court used “rational basis with a bite” review,
I am referring to the fact that the Court only admitted to using rational basis
review, but in actuality engaged in a more in-depth analysis. When the
Court does not assume that a statute is rationally connected to the
government interest put forth or sua sponte determines a government
interest that is related to the challenged statute, but instead searches to see
if the challenged statute is actually rationally related to a legitimate
government interest, then, in my opinion, it is applying “rational basis with a
bite” review.
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face if they want to simply read a book behind bars. Part II first
explores the standard of review that courts apply to prisoners’
rights litigation, focusing specifically on the standard of review for
current First Amendment litigation.
Second, Part II later
examines the level of deference that is granted to prison
administrators and how the standard affects the applicable
standard of review. In Part III I lay out why a form of heightened
review, “rational basis with a bite,” is called for when it comes to
prisoner reading rights. First, I present an equal protection
argument, succinctly analyzing a history of prisoners’ rights
litigation and identifying the political powerlessness of prisoners
and the animus against them. I also explain that the courts
cannot assume that the executive branch, administrative
agencies, or the legislature are protecting prisoners, as prisoners
are a vulnerable group.
Second, I present a due process
argument, arguing that the right to read is a fundamental right.
Part IV explains the developing “rational basis review with a bite”
jurisprudence,17 providing a sampling of the cases that have
applied it and explaining why it was applied. Finally, Part V
concludes that courts should, at minimum, use “rational basis
with a bite” review in order to adequately protect prisoners’ First
Amendment rights. In other words, courts should look closely to
ensure that there is actually a rational relationship between the
legislation or policy and the asserted legitimate government
interest.18
I. CURRENT POLICIES

Prisoners throughout the United States are forbidden from
reading a variety of publications.19
The list of banned
17. See Ferdon v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 460–61
(Wis. 2005) (“‘Rational basis with teeth,’ sometimes referred to as ‘rational
basis with bite,’ focuses on the legislative means used to achieve the ends.”).
18. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
19. See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3134.1 (2015). See also
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 404–06 (1989); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 548–49 (1979) (discussing the publisher-only rule, showing that there
are a variety of restrictions other than censorship that threaten prisoners’
First Amendment reading rights); TEX. CIV. RIGHTS PROJECT, BANNED BOOKS
IN THE TEXAS PRISON SYSTEM 11 (2011) [hereinafter BANNED BOOKS],
http://www.texascivilrightsproject.org/docs/prisonbooks/TCRP_Prison_Books_
Report.pdf; Matt Berman, The Banned Books and Censored Magazines of
Connecticut’s State Prisons, ATLANTIC (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.the
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publications varies from institution to institution,20 and each state
and federal prison system has a unique banned publication list.21
However, very few institutions make these lists accessible to the
public.22 By keeping these lists confidential, institutions are
preventing free citizens from learning about the restrictions and
policies. Thus, the public is not often in possession of the
necessary information to even understand the abridgement of
First Amendment rights that prisoners face.
Without this
information, those among us who sympathize with prisoners are
without the necessary tools to fight for the rights of the
incarcerated.
A. The Regulations
All federal prisoners are subject to a regulation that states:23
atlantic.com/national/archive/2013/08/the-banned-books-and-censoredmagazines-of-connecticuts-state-prisons/279207/. It is important to note that
in many institutions prisoners can only receive paperback newspapers and
periodicals from publishers; no hardcovers are permitted at all, and friends
and family cannot send any publications into the institutions. See 06-070-05
R.I. CODE R. § III (Lexis Nexis 2015).
20. See, e.g., TDCJ Banned Book List, TEX. C. R. PROJECT (Feb. 24, 2011),
http://www.texascivilrightsproject.org/2803/banned-books-in-the-texasprison-system-how-the-texas-department-of-criminal-justice-censors-bookssent-to-prisoners/ (follow “Download the banned books list to your computer:
Excel format” (3.5mb)); see also Andrew Losowsky, Prison Books Ban: The
Censorship Scandal Inside America’s Jails, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 3, 2011,
8:24 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/02/prison-books-ban_n_
991494.html.
21. See, e.g., BANNED BOOKS, supra note 19, at 11. See also Pat EatonRobb, Connecticut Prison Inmates Reading True Crime and Other Violent
Books, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 5, 2010, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2010/10/04/connecticut-prison-inmate_n_749592.html (noting how at
least two prisons within the state allow a particular publication concerning a
group of murders within Kansas in 1959); Warren Richey, Feds’ Request: Let
Us Take on Jail that Bans All Books Except the Bible, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2011/0413/
Feds-request-Let-us-take-on-jail-that-bans-all-books-except-the-Bible.
22. See BANNED BOOKS, supra note 19, at 11. Texas is one of the few
states that have made their banned book list publically accessible. See TDCJ
Banned Book List, supra note 20.
23. As of October 2014, the federal prison population consisted of
slightly less than 214,000 inmates. See Population Statistics, FED. BUREAU
PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/population_statistics.jsp (last
visited Oct. 20, 2014). These statistics, which are made publically available
by the Federal Bureau of Prisons, are updated each Thursday; the data in
this Comment reflect the numbers available on October 20, 2014.
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“[T]he Warden may reject a publication only if it is determined
detrimental to the security, good order, or discipline of the
institution or if it might facilitate criminal activity.”24 Conversely,
“the Warden may not reject a publication solely because its
content is religious, philosophical, political, social or sexual, or
because its content is unpopular or repugnant.”25 Moreover, an
additional federal regulation prevents inmates from obtaining
publications that have any pectoral images of nudity or sex
acts26—no law currently exists preventing written accounts of the
same. States have adopted similar regulations; however, many of
those regulations expressly allow for the banning of books due to
sexually explicit content.27
Based on the above, prisons may only lawfully ban
publications in order to further a legitimate penological
objective.28 “Penological interests are interests that relate to the
treatment (including punishment, deterrence, rehabilitation, etc.)
of persons convicted of crimes.”29 Two penological objectives
frequently cited for justifying censorship of publications within
prisons are rehabilitation and institutional security.30 Penological
interests sound like firm constructs. However, which books will
interfere with rehabilitation and where the border is between
publications that interfere with institutional security and those
that may merely depict violence or discuss weaponry but are
otherwise safe is open to interpretation. In other words, it is hard
to discern where the line is drawn between publications that
interfere with legitimate penological interests and those that are
protected from infringement. Additionally, no recent studies exist
which support the argument that certain publications hinder
rehabilitation or jeopardize institutional security. Due to the
deference afforded to prison administrators, the courts have not
looked deeper to determine whether pornography actually inhibits

24. 28 C.F.R. § 540.71 (2014).
25. Id.
26. Id. § 540.72.
27. See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGIS. tit. 15, § 3134.1(e) (2014).
28. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87 (1987).
29. Bull v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 595 F.3d 964, 996 (9th Cir. 2010)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 175, 187 n.10
(2d Cir. 2001)).
30. See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 525–26 (2006).
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rehabilitation of prisoners in general.31
Prison wardens often delegate the decision-making power to
prison employees, whether it is mailroom employees or glorified
inspectors.32 This delegation of decision-making power gives
employees the power to make the initial determination of whether
the publication in question, if not already banned in the
institution, is either: (a) appropriate for the prison population, or
(b) inappropriate for the prison population. Whether the book
should be rejected or not is often based on the particular
employee’s subjective understanding of the applicable policy or
statute.33 This fact is chilling because we are allowing non-elected
and largely anonymous individuals to routinely make subjective
decisions that limit a large population’s First Amendment rights.
It is not easy to determine whether a publication will be
detrimental to one of the penological interests of the institution
because it is largely a subjective decision. For example, some
schools of thought say reading about gang activities could
dissuade gang activity; others say that it could foster gang
activity.34 Publications that some individuals may think threaten
a penological interest may actually foster a penological interest,
and vice versa. Moreover, employees are provided with a cloak of
31. See Barry W. Lynn, “Civil Rights” Ordinances and the Attorney
General’s Commission: New Developments in Pornography Regulation, 21
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 27, 33 (1986).
32. See, e.g., 06-070-05 R.I. CODE R. § III(C) (Lexis Nexis 2015); BANNED
BOOKS, supra note 19, at 8.
33. See, e.g., BANNED BOOKS, supra note 19, at 8.
34. See Ciempa v. Jones, 745 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1177 (N.D. Okla. 2010),
aff’d, 511 F. App’x 781 (10th Cir. 2013). Ciempa involved several publications
that were withheld from a prisoner in Oklahoma because the publications
contained gang related material. See id. The Oklahoma Department of
Corrections has a regulation that provides:
Publications are prohibited that . . . Advocate terrorism, criminal
behavior, racial, religious, or national hatred, or any material that
creates an unsafe environment for the inmates or staff. . . . The
facility is not authorized to implement a prohibition on any
materials that inmates may receive by subscription, such as a
magazine, newspaper, or other similar type of periodical. Each issue
of the material has to be received and reviewed to determine
whether or not it violates the correspondence restrictions of this
agency. . . . Correspondence containing gang related material,
information, photographs, or symbols are prohibited.
Id. (quoting Okla. Dep’t of Corr., Facility Operations, Correspondence,
Publications, and Audio/Video Media Guidelines, OP-030117).
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anonymity to shield their identity from accountability if they
decide, in an abundance of caution, to ban more publications than
the applicable policy requires.35
Today, in Texas, if an incoming book is not already on the
banned book list, the employees in the mailroom make the
decision as to whether the prisoner will be allowed to read the
publication sent to him or her.36 If those employees determine
that the publication is inappropriate, then the publication is
added to Texas’s statewide banned book list, and the prisoner
must jump through administrative hoops to gain access to the
material.37 In Rhode Island, if the prison’s mailroom officer
determines that the publication is inappropriate or even
questionable, the mailroom officer forwards the publication to the
Central Office Investigator (Investigator) for review.38
The
Investigator determines if the publication is appropriate and
whether to give it to the inmate or not.39 Both the prisoner and
publisher are given notice as to the Investigator’s ultimate
decision if the book is not allowed.40
The deference afforded to these prison officials allows the
animus of society to dictate many of the regulations controlling
prisoners. We are trusting mailroom prison employees to protect
the First Amendment rights of America’s large prison population,
which is made up of the despised, outcasts of society.41 By giving
these employees the power to reject or permit publications based
on their own subjective judgment of whether the publications
would potentially threaten a legitimate government interest, we
are unjustly delegating the job of determining the exact extent of
prisoners’ First Amendment rights.42 The press has called these
35. The identity of the mailroom employees in prison institutions are not
publicized; even the identities of those in the Rhode Island prison system who
investigate questionable material are not well known.
36. See BANNED BOOKS, supra note 19, at 12.
37. See id.
38. See 06-070-05 R.I. CODE R. § III(C) (Lexis Nexis 2015).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 557 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); James E. Robertson, The Rehnquist Court and the
“Turnerization” of Prisoners’ Rights, 10 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 97, 118 & n.207
(2006).
42. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3134.1 (2014). See also Thornburgh v.
Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 406 (1989); BANNED BOOKS, supra note 19, at 12;
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employees’ decisions arbitrary in the few instances where such
decisions have been publicized.43 Allowing subjective, arbitrary
decisions to dictate the extent of prisoners’ First Amendment
rights is hardly rational.
The administrative processes that prisoners can utilize in an
attempt to gain access to “inappropriate” publications varies
slightly throughout the country.44 In most institutions, prisoners
can file a grievance45 in an attempt to gain access to the restricted
material.46 Members of the Department of Corrections, such as
wardens, directors, or committees, consider these grievances.47 In
Rhode Island, prisoners can request a review by the Assistant
Director of the Institution prior to beginning the formal grievance
process.48 Once a review of the prison employee’s initial findings
is conducted, many institutions afford prisoners the right to an
administrative appeal in order to question the institution’s
decision regarding the publication.49 However, it is important to
Berman, supra note 19.
43.
See, e.g., BANNED BOOKS, supra note 19, at 12; Berman, supra note
19. However, more often than not, when a prison employee decides to ban a
publication, notice only goes to the prisoner and perhaps the publisher; the
public remains in the dark. See, e.g., 06-070-05 R.I. CODE R. §§ III(A)(2)(i)(2),
III(A)(2)(j)(1)(b)(2).
44. See Giovanna Shay, Ad Law Incarcerated, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L.
329, 344–49 (2009).
45. For an outline of the basic grievance process and how it works in the
Rhode Island Prison system, see R.I. DEP’T CORR., INMATE HANDBOOK 30–32
(2007) [hereinafter R.I. INMATE HANDBOOK], http://www.doc.ri.gov/documents/
Inmate%20Handbook%20507.pdf.
46. See Jack Ryan, Handling Grievances in a Jail / Detention Setting,
LEGAL & LIABILITY RISK MGMT. INST., http://www.llrmi.com/articles/
jails/jail_grievances.shtml (last visited Dec. 8, 2015). One of the most
important tools for any jail is the grievance process by which inmates may
file complaints regarding conditions and situations where their rights may
have been violated. By providing prisoners with a proper grievance process,
the jail administration can resolve issues within the jail environment before
the conditions or events lead to a full-blown lawsuit. See id.; see also BANNED
BOOKS, supra note 19, at 8–12; R.I. INMATE HANDBOOK, supra note 45, at 30–
32.
47. See Shay, supra note 44, at 344–49.
48. See R.I. DEP’T OF CORR., POL’Y AND PROC.: POLICY NO. 24.01-6,
Attachment C, p. 2 (2010), [hereinafter Inmate Mail], http://www.doc.ri.gov/
documents/administration/policy/Inmate%20Mail%20Policy%2013.pdf.
49. See, e.g., 14B N.C. ADMIN. CODE 12B.0103 (2013) (“[T]he inmate
should be notified in writing within 24 hours of the reason for censorship.
The inmate shall be afforded the opportunity to appeal the decision in
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note that during the grievance and/or appeals process, the
institution returns the publication at issue to the sender.50
Therefore, the prisoner is at a distinct disadvantage when
requesting a review, filing a grievance, or appealing an
institution’s decision because the prisoner lacks access to the
banned material to formulate his challenge.51 Thus, the review
processes discussed are often insufficient. In many systems, once
the validity of a publication’s ban is denied on appeal, another
prisoner cannot appeal the same publication’s ban at a later
date.52 The appeals process is essentially nonexistent if the book
requested is already a banned book.53
If a prisoner loses his challenge at the administrative level, he
may bring his challenge to the courts.54 Only after exhausting his
or her appeal at the administrative level can a prisoner challenge
a prison administrator’s decision by filing a claim in court,
alleging that the decision violated his First Amendment rights.55
In many prisons throughout the country, prisoners yearn to
read prohibited publications.56 For example, in 2011, The New
York Times and other various publishers published a story on
Mark Melvin, an inmate serving a life sentence at Kilby
Correctional Facility outside of Montgomery, Alabama.57 Melvin
was prevented from receiving and reading the Pulitzer Prize
winning book, Slavery by Another Name, by Douglas A.
Blackmon.58 The book details a historical investigation on how
writing, within seven days, directly to the Director of the Division of
Prisons.”). See also Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 406 (1989); BANNED
BOOKS, supra note 19, at 12.
50. See, e.g., Inmate Mail, supra note 48, at Attachment C, p. 2.
51. See Jones, supra note 6.
52. See id.; see also BANNED BOOKS, supra note 19, at 8–12.
53. See BANNED BOOKS, supra note 19, at 8–12.
54. See generally Tracking Prisoner Censorship in the U.S., MAOIST
INTERNATIONALIST MINISTRY PRISONS, http://www.prisoncensorship.info/data
(last visited Dec. 8, 2015) (providing a database of prison censorship cases).
55. See id.
56. See generally Clay Calvert & Kara C. Murrhee, Big Censorship in the
Big House—A Quarter-Century After Turner v. Safley: Muting Movies, Music
& Books Behind Bars, 7 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 257 (2012).
57. Campbell Robertson, Alabama Inmate Sues to Read Sothern History
Book, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/27/
us/alabama-inmate-sues-to-read-southern-history-book.html; see Losowsky,
supra note 20.
58. See Losowsky, supra note 20; see generally DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON,
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black prisoners were treated in the South during the late 19th and
early 20th century.59 When the prison officials refused to give
Melvin his book, Melvin appealed, but the prison officials upheld
their decision to ban the book.60 As support, the officials “cit[ed] a
regulation banning any mail that incites ‘violence based on race,
religion, sex, creed, or nationality, or disobedience toward law
enforcement officials or correctional staff.’”61 Following the denial
of his appeal, Melvin brought a lawsuit against the prison
officials.62 The author of the banned publication commented on
the absurdity of banning his book, noting that “[t]he idea that a
book like mine is somehow incendiary or a call to violence is so
absurd.”63
After a prisoner exhausts his administrative appeals, a
prisoner’s only available means of gaining access to the banned
publication is to file a suit in court, which Melvin did.64
Information concerning the ultimate outcome of Melvin’s suit has
not been publicized since 2012, at which time his lawsuit was in
the discovery phase.65 Numerous cases have been brought by
prisoners challenging the constitutionality of various restrictions
on their ability to access certain publications—some of which have
made their way all the way to the United States Supreme Court,
as discussed below.66
In Texas, in 2008, 11,544 of the books sent to state prisoners
SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME (2008).
59. See The Book, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME, http://www.slaveryby
anothername.com/the-book/ (last visited Dec. 8, 2015) (providing a
description of Slavery by Another Name).
60. See Losowsky, supra note 20; Robertson, supra note 57.
61. Robertson, supra note 57.
62. See id.
63. See id. (quoting Telephone Interview with Douglas A. Blackmun,
Author, Slavery by Another Name (2008)).
64. See COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV., A JAILHOUSE LAWYER’S MANUAL ch. 22
(8th ed. 2009) (establishing that the step after administrative remedies is
filing suit in federal court). For more information on Melvin’s lawsuit, see
Stephanie Siek, Prison Bars White Inmate from Reading ‘Slavery by Another
Name,’ Citing Security Risk, CNN: IN AMERICA (Feb. 29, 2012, 7:00 AM),
http://inamerica.blogs.cnn.com/2012/02/29/ala-prison-bars-white-inmatefrom-reading-slavery-by-another-name-citing-security-risk/.
65. See Siek, supra note 64.
66. See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006); Thornburgh v. Abbott,
490 U.S. 401 (1989); Thompson v. Campbell, 81 F. App’x 563 (6th Cir. 2003).
See also Tracking Prisoner Censorship in the U.S., supra note 54.
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never reached the inmates because the books were banned by
either: (a) already being on the banned book list, or (b) being
deemed inappropriate by a mailroom employee in one of Texas’s
prisons.67 Prisoners appealed decisions 2472 times in 2008 alone;
the Texas Department of Criminal Justice heard only 1210 of
these appeals because approximately 1200 of the books were
already permanently banned.68 At the end of 2009, Texas prisons
had banned 11,851 titles.69 The Texas Department of Criminal
Justice had permanently banned 8002 of the 11,851 titles.70
B. The Arbitrariness of Prison’s Decisions to Ban Books
In addition to the shocking number of publications that
institutions have banned based on the subjective opinion of
designated prison employees, there are numerous examples of
publication bans within prisons that make the whole process
appear even more arbitrary. For example, in Connecticut,71 state
prisoners were prohibited from reading the first book in the A
Song of Ice and Fire series.72 However, at the same time,
prisoners were permitted to read, A Clash of Kings or A Storm of
Swords, later books in the same series.73 When considering a
prisoner’s administrative appeal, the Connecticut Bureau of
Corrections finally made the first book in the series accessible to
67. See BANNED BOOKS, supra note 19, at 12–13 (describing the
discretion given to the employees to determine if, in a case of first impression,
a publication should be admitted into an institution).
68. See id.
69. See id. at 13 n.16.
70. See id. at 13.
71. In Connecticut:
Each facility shall establish a review process for all incoming
publications in accordance with guidelines established by the Media
Review Board. The Unit Administrator or designee shall review the
individual publication prior to the rejection of that publication. The
Media Review Board shall then review anything deemed
objectionable by the facility and notify the Unit Administrator or
designee of the decision.
Conn. Dep’t of Corr., Administrative Directive 10.7(4)(N)(2) [hereinafter
Inmate Communications], available at http://www.ct.gov/doc/LIB/doc/PDF/
AD/ad1007.pdf.
72. See Berman, supra note 19.
73. See id. Some prisoners did in fact read the series out of order
because of a prior ban on the first book in the series, A Game of Thrones. See
id.
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inmates.74 Other prisons have banned a variety of great literary
classics. For example, some of the books that Texas permanently
banned within its prisons include: Shakespeare & Love Sonnets,
Utopia, Burmese Days, and Dante Alighieri’s Inferno.75
The free flow of ideas, especially political ideas, is a key
element of American democracy.76 A federal prison in Colorado
actually banned President Obama’s books, Dreams from My
Father and The Audacity of Hope.77 This ban halted the free flow
of political ideas, which is directly adverse to the spirit of the First
Amendment. The decisions to ban Obama’s books were later
overturned through the appeals process, demonstrating that the
initial ban was not related to a legitimate penological interest.78
While commenting on prison censorship, Andrea Jones
discussed Prison Legal News (PLN), a national publication of
which the majority of subscribers are prison-inmates.79 The goal
of PLN is to increase political awareness and inform prisoners of
their rights.80
Jones stated that PLN has “faced blanket
censorship in over ten state prisons systems, and countless bans
in local jails across the country.”81
This type of “blanket
censorship” might exemplify that some prisons actually aim to
keep prisoners uninformed regarding the information that is most
valuable. As the free flow of ideas, especially political ideas, is a
key element of American democracy, it is significant that prisons
are banning a publication that informs prisoners of their rights.
Informing prisoners of their rights and transforming them into
more engaged citizens is a step toward their rehabilitation. Yet,
prisons frequently justify bans on the basis that access to certain
publications would be detrimental to rehabilitation. Banning

74. See id.
75. See BANNED BOOKS, supra note 19, at 40–41.
76. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 108 F.
Supp. 2d 498, 511 (E.D.N.C. 2000) (“[T]he principle that core political speech,
essential to the free flow of ideas in a democracy, occupies a highly protected
place within First Amendment jurisprudence.”).
77. See Sean Hannity, Why Did One Prison Ban Obama’s Books?, FOX
NEWS (July 14, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2009/07/14/why-did-oneprison-ban-obama-books.html.
78. See id.
79. See Jones, supra note 6.
80. See id.
81. Id.
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informative publications such as PLN can actually threaten the
same goal that institutions are seeking to accomplish.
Censorship is occurring in prisons throughout the country and
threatens prisoners’ First Amendment rights. Yet, many of the
decisions to ban publications within prisons appear arbitrary.
While Mr. Melvin’s story was reported, his story is but a grain of
sand on a beach full of individuals who are being denied access to
publications. The vast majority of these individuals’ stories go
untold. Now, we face the question of what happens when
prisoners, like Mr. Melvin, or the countless others whose
grievances and/or administrative appeals are denied, bring their
challenges to court.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In 1964, the Supreme Court in Cooper v. Pate implicitly
recognized that prisoners keep some of their constitutional
protections.82 The Court also acknowledged in Cooper that
prisoners could seek protection of their constitutional rights and
guarantees through the court systems.83 More pointedly, in 1974,
the Supreme Court expressly expounded in Pell v. Procunier that
“a prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are
not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the
legitimate penological objectives of the correctional system.”84
Before the Court’s decision in Turner v. Safley, the Court was
hesitant to discern a clear standard of review for courts to use in
determining whether a prison regulation or policy violated a
prisoner’s First Amendment rights.85 In Turner, the Court
considered the legality of two regulations: the first regulation
censored correspondences between inmates at different
82. See 378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964); Stacey A. Miness, Note, Pornography
Behind Bars, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1702, 1707 (2000); see also Victoria Ford,
Case Note, First Amendment Rights Behind Bars: To Deny a Prisoner
Pornography, the Third Circuit in Ramirez v. Pugh Requires Proof of
Detriment to Rehabilitation, 13 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 73, 74 & n.10 (2006)
(noting that prisoners retain the same constitutional protections as citizens
so long as the rights at issue do not conflict with goals of incarceration).
83. Miness, supra note 82, at 1707.
84. 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). Pell involved members of the press who
were denied access to interview prison inmates face-to-face. See id. The
Court held that the First Amendment does not guarantee the press any
special access to inmates beyond what is given to the public. Id.
85. See 482 U.S. 78, 85–89 (1987); Miness, supra note 82, at 1707.
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institutions, and the second regulation affected prisoners’ ability
to marry.86 Having yet to pronounce an appropriate standard for
assessing the constitutionality of prisoners’ rights, the Court used
Turner to declare the appropriate standard.87 The Court held that
“when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional
rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests.”88 It is clear from both the
language of Turner and the language of subsequent cases where
the Turner factors have been applied that the Turner test is
advocating for rational basis review.89
The Court ultimately established four factors to help courts
determine “the reasonableness of the regulation[s] at issue.”90
The Turner test is in some ways a totality of the circumstances
test; however, if the first factor is not satisfied, then the regulation
is not reasonable.91 In determining what factors a court should
consider in order to decide whether a prison regulation or policy is
reasonable, the Court reviewed prisoners’ rights jurisprudence.92
The first factor the Court articulated is that “there must be a
‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison regulation and the
legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it.”93 The
regular rational basis test provides that the means of a regulation
must be rationally related to serving a legitimate governmental
interest; the language of the traditional rational basis test is quite
similar to the language the Court used for this factor.94
86. Turner, 482 U.S. at 81–82. Turner held that, while the censorship of
prisoner-to-prisoner correspondence was reasonably related to legitimate
security concerns, the regulation restricting access to marriage was not; it
was considered an exaggerated response to the institution’s security and
rehabilitative concerns. Id. at 91.
87. Id. at 78.
88. Id. at 89.
89. See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006).
90. Turner, 482 U.S. at 84–90.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 78–79.
93. Id. at 89 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).
Further, the Court stated that it found it “important” to ensure that policies
that regulated First Amendment rights were neutral and not content based.
Id. at 90.
94. Compare Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 486,
488–90 (1955) (applying the traditional rational basis test and holding that a
state regulation of appropriate vendors of optometry equipment was not
unconstitutional as the regulation was rationally related to a government
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Essentially, the Court is using this factor to establish the principle
that in order for a potentially restrictive prison regulation to be
reasonable, it must pass the rational basis test.95
The second factor the Court used to determine if a regulation
was reasonable was “whether there are alternative means of
exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates.”96 If one
mode of expression is limited in order to advance a legitimate
government interest, then the Court wants to assess the other
options prisoners have to express themselves.97 In Turner, the
Court expressly advised deference only if there existed alternative
avenues available for the exercise of the asserted right.98
Third, the Court inquired into the challenges a prison could
face if the prison was forced to provide the inmate’s requested
freedom.99 Again, the Court expressly advised deference only
“[w]hen accommodation of an asserted right will have a significant
‘ripple effect’ on fellow inmates or on prison staff.”100 Finally, the
Court advised lower courts to consider the absence of sufficient
alternatives to censorship.101 The Court stated, “the absence of
ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison
regulation.”102 However, existence of a less restrictive alternative
that accomplished the same desired governmental interest would
be some evidence that the regulation violated prisoners’ rights.103
Lower courts continue to use the Turner factors to determine if
prison regulations violate prisoners’ constitutional rights.104
interest), with Turner, 482 U.S at 89–90 (asserting that prison regulations
must be rationally and logically connected to a legitimate government
interest to be considered “reasonable” for the purposes of judicial review).
95. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90.
96. Id. at 90.
97. See Anna C. Burns, Note, Beard v. Banks: Restricted Reading,
Rehabilitation, and Prisoners’ First Amendment Rights, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1225,
1239–40 (2007) (noting the role of deference while also recognizing the need
to protect prisoners from total deprivation of their rights).
98. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 90–91.
102. Id. at 90.
103. Id. at 90–91.
104. See, e.g., Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131–32, 135–36 (2003);
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989); Thompson v. Campbell, 81
Fed. App’x. 563, 566–67 (6th Cir. 2003); Willson v. Buss, 370 F. Supp. 2d 782,
786–87, 790 (N.D. Ind. 2005).
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A couple years after Turner, the Court decided Thornburgh v.
Abbot, which focused on the censorship of publications sent to
prisoners.105
In Thornburgh, the Court harkened that the
reasonableness standard, applied in Turner, would also apply to
incoming mail (including, but not limited to, publications that are
sent to prisons).106 The Court “adopt[ed] the Turner standard . . .
with confidence that . . . ‘a reasonableness standard is not
toothless.’”107 Thus, Thornburgh clarified that courts should use
the Turner test to evaluate whether or not a prison regulation has
violated a prisoner’s fundamental rights. The Court found the
Turner test preferable for analyzing these regulations because of
its “express flexibility.”108
The Turner factors appear to lay the foundation of a balancing
test in which the court weighs the prisoner’s rights against the
institution’s legitimate penological interests. However, if a court
really analyzes the four Turner factors, it would be applying
something more than the traditional rational basis review.109 The
Court made it clear in Turner that the prison regulations at issue
did not prompt a heightened standard of scrutiny, which the lower
courts had previously applied.110 Instead, the Court inquired only
whether the “prison regulation[s] that [burden] fundamental
rights [are] ‘reasonably related’ to legitimate penological
objectives, or whether [they represent] an ‘exaggerated response’
to those concerns.”111
The Court may have rejected an
intermediate or strict standard of review, but the Court left traces
of a heightened standard throughout the Turner decision. While
the first factor primarily lays out the rational basis test, the other
three factors look deeper—contemplating other available means of
exercising the right, considering difficulties that would result if
the prison was forced to forgo the restriction at issue, and
inquiring into possible regulatory alternatives that would
accomplish the asserted interest.112 To some extent, these factors
105. 490 U.S at 403, 408, 412–14.
106. Id. at 412–14; see also Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–91.
107. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 414 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari
at 17 n.10, Thornburgh, 490 U.S. 401 (No. 87-1344)).
108. Id.
109. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–91.
110. Id. at 83, 86.
111. Id. at 87.
112. Id. at 89–91.
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inquire into whether the statute is the least restrictive means of
accomplishing the goal. Courts only consider least restrictive
means when applying strict scrutiny.113 Thus, to fully comply
with Turner, courts should, at minimum, be honestly considering
how the regulation at issue holds up against each of the four
factors. Moreover, just because Turner sets forth a “rational
basis” review, does not mean that the rational basis standard is
what should be applied by the courts because the Supreme Court
does not always get the questions before it correct.114 Prisoners
need the courts to apply a more meaningful review than
traditional rational basis review. Therefore, even if the Court was
setting forth a traditional rational basis test within Turner, which
I do not believe it was, then courts should reject that test and
apply a slightly more meaningful review when prisoners’ rights
are at issue.
A. The Inescapable Problem of Deference
Even though Turner and its progenies, including Bell v.
Wolfish, deal with protecting prisoners’ First Amendment rights,
the Court frequently promoted deference towards prison
administrators within these cases.115 When the Court dealt with
prisoners’ First Amendment rights in Bell v. Wolfish, the Court
justified giving deference to prison administrators on the ground
that “the problems that arise in the day-to-day operation of a
corrections facility are not susceptible of easy solutions.”116 There
are additional rationales for the Court to give prison
administrators deference. First, “courts are ill equipped to deal
113. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
602 (18th ed. 2013).
114. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216–18 (1944);
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 393–94 (1857).
115. See 441 U.S. 520, 547–48 (1979); Turner, 482 U.S. at 85–87, 89–91;
see also Clay Calvert & Justin B. Hayes, To Defer or Not to Defer? Deference
and Its Differential Impact on First Amendment Rights in the Roberts Court,
63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 13, 44 (2012) (“[T]he Turner test ‘emphasizes
deference to prison officials and the relative technical and administrative
expertise of corrections authorities.’”) (quoting Giovanna Shay, Ad Law
Incarcerated, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 329, 341 (2009)).
116. Bell, 441 U.S. at 547. The reasoning behind the Court’s decision to
provide deference to prison administrators largely mirrors the reasoning
behind the Court’s choice to endorse a rational basis review in cases of this
nature. See supra Section II.A.
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with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration
and reform.”117 Second, prison administrators’ responsibilities,
including “maintaining order, securing the prisons against escape,
and rehabilitating prisoners, require expertise and complex
planning.”118
And third, the responsibility of running and
organizing prisons is markedly “within the province of the
legislative and executive branches of government,” not the
judiciary.119 While the aforementioned reasons behind allowing
prison administrators a degree of regulatory deference may make
sense, the degree of deference allowed remains far too great.
The Court instructed the judiciary to “accord[ ] wide-ranging
deference” to prison administrators when the prison
administrators maintain that they adopted and executed the
policies and practices in question because, in their judgment, the
policies and practices “are needed to preserve internal order and
discipline and to maintain institutional security.”120 While the
Court claimed that it sought to balance the constitutional rights of
inmates with legitimate penological government objectives, the
level of deference afforded to prison administrators causes the
purported balancing test in Turner to be heavily slanted against
prisoners.121 Today, the lower courts’ application of Turner has
continued to accord prison officials a high level of deference.122
Recently, the level of deference afforded to prison
administrators has bordered on the edge of absurdity. For
example, in Beard v. Banks, the Court considered a prison
administrator’s motion for summary judgment on a prisoner’s
claim that the application of a prison policy violated the prisoner’s
117. Turner, 482 U.S. at 84 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,
404–05 (1974)).
118. Peter R. Shults, Note, Calling the Supreme Court: Prisoners’
Constitutional Right to Telephone Use, 92 B.U. L. REV. 369, 373 (2012).
119. Turner, 482 U.S. at 84–85.
120. Bell, 441 U.S. at 547 (collecting cases).
121. See Burns, supra note 97, at 1225–28.
122. See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 521, 524–25 (2006); Kaufman
v. Schneiter, 474 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1023 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (noting the “highly
deferential” approach courts have taken toward evaluating prison regulations
when following Turner); Self v. Horel, No. C 07-5347 MMC (PR), 2008 WL
5048392, at *1, *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2008) (applying the Turner test and
concluding that a prison regulation that banned all material with frontal
nudity, including an educational book on how to draw, did not violate
prisoners’ First Amendment rights).
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First Amendment Rights.123 The Court declared: “[A]t this stage
we must draw ‘all justifiable inferences’ in [the prisoner’s] ‘favor.’
In doing so, however, we must distinguish between evidence of
disputed facts and disputed matters of professional judgment. In
respect to the latter, our inferences must accord deference to the
views of prison authorities.”124
The distinction above twists the summary judgment standard,
which traditionally draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party rather than distinguishing “disputed matters of
professional judgment” as a separate consideration.125 If other
courts give similar breadths of deference to prison administrators
at this stage of the litigation, it will be very difficult for a
prisoner’s challenge to survive a summary judgment motion. The
level of deference that courts afford to the prison administrators is
often outcome-determinative; as a result, a motion for summary
judgment is an extremely effective pre-trial strategy for
administrators.126 For instance, if a prison administrator asserts
that a policy, regulation, or particular ban is necessary for
security, rehabilitation, or another penological interest, then,
regardless of the truth or extremity of that interest, the courts
defer to the administrator’s judgment. Thus, the courts are
inclined to defer to the prison administrator’s judgment regardless
of whether a prisoner claims that a policy is in violation of the
prisoner’s rights, or that the regulated material is appropriate.
123. 548 U.S. at 524–25.
124. Id. at 529–30 (citations omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).
125. See LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir. 1993)
(acknowledging that the summary judgment standard requires a court to
“review the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and to
draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor”). In Beard,
the prisoner was the non-moving party, but he was not given the benefit of all
reasonable assumptions. See 548 U.S. at 521. Instead, the government was
given the benefit of inferences in its favor because of the level of deference
afforded to the prison administrators. See id. at 525, 528, 530. Summary
judgment is only appropriate when there is not an issue of material fact. See
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P.
56(c)). Typically, the prisoners’ contentions would create an issue of material
fact; however, the deference afforded to the administrators overrides the
prisoner’s argument. This deprives the prisoner of his right to trial because
the deference afforded prevents him from getting past the summary
judgment stage.
126. See Calvert & Hayes, supra note 115, at 53.
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Beard provides a more specific example of the above
phenomena. There, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
deprived all inmates initially, and certain inmates continuously, of
the right to access photographs and secular magazines or
newspapers.127 The deputy superintendent of the prison claimed
that this regulation encouraged inmates to engage in positive
behavior.128 The Court accepted this contention as rational while
relying on only the deposition testimony of the deputy
superintendent.129 The Court stated “that the regulations do, in
fact, serve the function identified.”130 Thus, the Court held that
even at the summary judgment stage, there was no dispute as to
whether the regulation was rationally related to the penological
goal of rehabilitation—despite the fact that statistics and the
prisoner refuted the deputy superintendent’s contention.131
Ordinarily, the prisoner’s contention and the statistics would have
created a genuine issue of material fact and precluded summary
judgment, but the deference afforded to the prison administrator’s
contention ended the case at the summary judgment stage of
litigation.132
The current state of jurisprudence makes it quite difficult for
prisoners to successfully challenge a law or policy as violating
their constitutional rights because the judiciary affords high
deference to the prison administrators.133 In Justice Stevens’s
opinion in Turner, concurring in part and dissenting in part, he
warned that this would happen, declaring that the majority’s
standard was “virtually meaningless” and would “permit
disregard for inmates’ constitutional rights whenever the
imagination of the warden produces a plausible security concern
and a deferential trial court is able to discern a logical connection

127. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525–27.
128. Id. at 530.
129. Id. at 529–30.
130. Id. at 531.
131. Id. at 530, 534–35.
132. See id. at 525, 532–35.
133. See, e.g., id. at 529–30; Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132
(2003); Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1521 (9th Cir. 1993); Self v. Horel, No. C
07-5347 MMC (PR), 2008 WL 5048392, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2008);
Kaufman v. Schneiter, 474 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1023 (W.D. Wis. 2007); Snow v.
Woodford, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 862, 869 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
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between that concern and the challenged regulation.”134
Therefore, the level of deference afforded to prison administrators
has made the rational basis review that courts afford to a
prisoner’s challenges even weaker than traditional rational basis
review.
III. WHY COURTS SHOULD REVIEW PRISONERS’ CLAIMS THAT
REGULATIONS ARE VIOLATING THEIR RIGHT TO READ WITH HEIGHTENED
SCRUTINY

There is a large variety of information that is withheld from
prisoners. When prisoners challenge the regulations and policies
that endorse censorship, prisoners need the courts to actually
listen to their claims with an open mind. It is inappropriate to
give government policies and regulations such a high level of
deference. As discussed below, prisoners are politically weak and
vulnerable; there is excessive anti-inmate animosity in America;
they have a history of unequal treatment; and they are currently
segregated from the rest of society.
From a Due Process
perspective, the above regulations require heighted scrutiny
because prisoners’ reading rights are fundamental.
When
fundamental rights are threatened the court applies strict
scrutiny.135 It follows that prisoners should be entitled to, at the
very least, a meaningful form of rational basis review when their
fundamental rights are threatened.

134. 482 U.S. 78, 100–01 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The standard of review applied here ignores facts that
lead the fact finder to hold that the violation at issue did violate prisoner’s
rights. As Stevens’ opinion stated:
Because the record contradicts the conclusion that the
administrative burden of screening all inmate-to-inmate mail would
be unbearable, an outright ban is intolerable.
The blanket
prohibition enforced at [the institution] is not only an “excessive
response” to any legitimate security concern; it is inconsistent with a
consensus of expert opinion—including Kansas correctional
authorities—that is far more reliable than the speculation to which
this Court accords deference.
Id. at 112.
135. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)
(acknowledging the need for a strict scrutiny review of regulations that might
curtail the civil rights of a single group).
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A. Equal Protection
Courts review challenged laws and policies to determine if
groups or classes are being unequally treated for an impermissible
reason.136 A “class” is “a group of people, things, qualities, or
activities that have common characteristics or attributes.”137 The
court reviews the challenged regulation more closely if the
regulation affects certain classes than if it affects others. For
instance, a regulation that makes distinctions based on race is
examined more closely than a regulation that makes distinctions
based on economic classifications; this is because classes based on
race are suspect classes.138 Courts consider certain factors in
order to determine whether a class qualifies as a suspect class, a
semi-suspect class, or neither:139 history of purposeful unequal
treatment,140 political powerlessness,141 immutability, origin of
distinguishing characteristics,142 relevance of characteristic to
state objectives, and discreteness and coherence of the group.143 If
a law or policy infringes on a suspect class’s constitutional right,
the courts uses strict scrutiny to determine if the infringement is
136. See SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 113, at 601–02.
137. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 119 (4th ed. Supp. 2011).
138. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 487, 494 (1954); see
also SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 113, at 602.
139. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 429–30 (Conn.
2008) (“[C]ourts generally have applied the same criteria to determine
whether a classification is suspect, quasi-suspect or neither. Just as there is
no uniformly applied formula for determining whether a group is entitled to
heightened protection under the constitution, there also is no clear test for
determining whether a group that deserves such protection is entitled to
designation as a suspect class or as a quasi-suspect class.” (citations omitted)
(citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440–42
(1985); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1976))).
140. See, e.g., Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313.
141. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28
(1973).
142. See, e.g., Miriam J. Aukerman, The Somewhat Suspect Class:
Towards A Constitutional Framework for Evaluating Occupational
Restrictions Affecting People with Criminal Records, 7 J. L. SOC’Y 18, 59–60
(2005). Yet, “[f]aultlessness is . . . not necessary for suspect class status. For
example, non-citizens, at least to the extent that they entered the United
States as adults, can be understood as being accountable for their
status[.] . . . Yet, legal aliens are protected under strict scrutiny, even though
they chose their status.” Id. at 60; see also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 372 (1971).
143. See, e.g., Aukerman, supra note 142, at 51.
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constitutionally permissible.144
When the courts subject a
regulation or policy to strict scrutiny the government must show
that its policy is necessary to achieve a compelling state
interest.145 If this is proved, the state must then demonstrate
that the legislation is narrowly tailored to achieve the intended
result.146 Courts use intermediate scrutiny if a law or policy
infringes on the rights of a quasi-suspect class.147 When the
courts subject a regulation or policy to intermediate scrutiny, the
government must show that the challenged law advances an
important government interest by means that are “substantially
related” to that interest.148 For regulations that do not involve a
classification, courts apply a “minimal rational review to
determine whether there the regulation bears a rational
relationship to a legitimate government interest.”149
Prisoners have many of the indicia of being a suspect class or
quasi-suspect class.150
Prisoners have a history of being
intentionally treated harshly by those in control of their
environment; prisoners are politically weak if not powerless; and
prisoners are an insular and discrete class—I discuss each in more
detail below.151 Courts have held that prisoners are not a suspect
class or semi-suspect class, and thus, are not entitled to
intermediate or strict scrutiny if a law or policy affects their
rights.152 The courts are reluctant to award a heightened review
144. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996); see also
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at
422.
145. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 635; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 414, 422.
146. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 625–26; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 414.
147. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1993); Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976).
148. See, e.g., Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 423 (quoting Ramos v. Vernon, 353
F.3d 171, 175 (2d Cir. 2003)).
149. SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 113, at 602.
150. See Jason E. Pepe, Challenging Congress’s Latest Attempt to Confine
Prisoners’ Constitutional Rights: Equal Protection and the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, 23 HAMLINE L. REV. 58, 79 (1999).
151. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 557 (1984) (Steven, J.,
dissenting) (“Prisoners are truly the outcasts of society. Disenfranchised,
scorned and feared . . . [and] shut away from public view, prisoners are surely
a ‘discrete and insular minority’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Bernal v.
Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 222 n.7 (1984))); James E. Robertson, The
Jurisprudence of the PLRA: Inmates As “Outsiders” and the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 187, 204 (2001).
152. See, e.g., Phillips v. Monroe Cty., 311 F.3d 369, 376 n.2 (5th Cir.
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to prisoners because they are responsible for being members of
their class.153 However, prisoners share many traits with groups
that the Courts has classified as suspect or quasi-suspect classes.
The similarities between prisoners and classes that the Court has
deemed suspect or quasi-suspect classes demonstrate that
prisoners are in a weak position within our society.
1. The Early Rise of Animus Towards Inmates in Judicial
Review
Viewing the social, political, and cultural history of prisoners
in the United States demonstrates that prisoners’ rights warrant
a stricter judicial review than the current highly deferential,
rational basis review that is being afforded to prisoners’
challenges.154 In America, prisons were initially institutionalized
in the 1800s.155 The first two American prisons were Cherry Hill,
which was a solitary confinement institution where the prisoners
neither saw nor spoke to one another, and Auburn, which was a
New York state institution where prisoners were forced to walk in
lockstep, perform hard labor, and remain in constant silence.156 A
warden at the Auburn institution believed it was actually his duty
to break the spirit of the prisoners; he “encouraged his guards to
treat the inmates with contempt and flogged the insane and
epileptic as well as the recalcitrant.”157 The traditional view was
that prisoners had no rights because prisoners forfeited their
2002); Nicholas v. Tucker, 114 F.3d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 1997); Myers v. Lewis, No.
93-16373, 1994 WL 83278, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 1994); White v. Wexford
Health Sources, Inc., No. 2:09-CV-00161-GHD-JMV, 2012 WL 3000645, at *4
(N.D. Miss. July 23, 2012); Hernandez v. Dretke, No. Civ.A. 104CV186C,
2005 WL 170722, at *4–5 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2005).
153. See Walker Newell, An Irrational Oversight: Applying the PLRA’s
Fee Restrictions to Collateral Prisoner Litigation, 15 CUNY L. REV. 53, 71
(2011).
154. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 472–73
n.24 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
155. See Miness, supra note 82, at 1704 (citing Alvin J. Bronstein,
Offender Rights Litigation: Historical and Future Developments, in 2
PRISONERS’ RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK 5, 5 (Ira P. Robbins ed., 1980)).
156. See Kathleen Engel & Stanley Rothman, The Paradox of Prison
Reform: Rehabilitation, Prisoners’ Rights, and Violence, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 413, 418–19 (1984).
157. Id. at 419 (quoting JOHN BARTLOW MARTIN, BREAK DOWN THE
WALLS 115 (1954)).
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rights as a punishment for committing and being convicted of a
crime.158 Nineteenth-century courts openly supported this notion
because courts are a product of their contemporary society, in that
judges are citizens too.159 In a published decision during this
time, one court stated that a convict, while imprisoned, “has, as a
consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty, but all his
personal rights except those which the law in its humanity accords
to him. He is for the time being the slave of the State.”160 At this
time, the courts followed the view that the legislature, executive,
and prison officials were responsible for drafting and
implementing the laws that would dictate the condition in which
inmates would live; the courts followed this view to such an extent
that they kept their hands off prisoners’ rights.161
Eventually, courts accepted that prisoners had rights, but
they followed what is called the “hands-off” doctrine towards
prisoners.162 Just as the name implies, the “hands-off” doctrine
meant that the judiciary did not interfere with internal operations
of prisons; under the “hands-off” doctrine the courts were without
power to supervise prison administration or interfere with
ordinary prison rules and regulations.163 Essentially, the “handsoff” doctrine prevented the judiciary from protecting prisoners’
rights.164 This doctrine existed because the courts “assumed they
had no power to supervise prison administration or interfere with
prison rules or regulations, even in the face of a possible
constitutional violation.”165 Inmates imprisoned during the epoch
158. See Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871);
Miness, supra note 82, at 1704.
159. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 425 (1857) (holding
that a slave brought to a free state would remain a slave because, as an
African American, he was not a citizen, and, thus, he did not have standing to
sue); Ruffin, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) at 796 (holding that the Court had thus
endorsed slavery and a version of concentration camps at a time when society
had deemed those things acceptable because, unfortunately, the animus of
society occasionally invades the courts); see also Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (holding it constitutional to intern Japanese
Americans during World War II).
160. Ruffin, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) at 796.
161. See id.; see also Miness, supra note 82, at 1704–05.
162. See Miness, supra note 82, at 1705.
163. See, e.g., Davis v. Finney, 902 P.2d 498, 501 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995).
164. See, e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 485 F. Supp. 122, 130 (D. Colo. 1979);
Clements v. Turner, 364 F. Supp. 270, 276 (D. Utah 1973).
165. Cheryl Dunn Giles, Note, Turner v. Safley and Its Progeny: A
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of the “hands-off doctrine experienced a host of inhumane acts,
including racial segregation[,] poor medical care[,] inmate-oninmate assault[,] staff brutality and indifference[,] and
squalor.”166 Coinciding with the civil rights movement of the
1960s, as well as numerous prison riots around the country
protesting the terrible conditions inside prisons, courts began to
reject the hands-off doctrine.167 Although courts were willing to
hear prisoners’ challenges that regulations and policies violated
their constitutional rights, as one scholar documented, “remnants
of the ‘hands-off’ doctrine [remained throughout] the area of
prisoner [rights] litigation.”168
While the “hands-off” doctrine has eroded, courts remain
reluctant to involve themselves in the problems that arise in
prison administration.169
The deference afforded to prison
administrators today is a remnant of the “hands-off” doctrine.170
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted that
this deference is owed to the prison administers,171 and thus, has
led other courts to follow its precedent and furnish prison
administrators with deference as well.172 Prison administrators
and the legislature are primarily entrusted with the task of
running prisons and setting policies.173 The judiciary has not
sought to step in and take an active role in the running of
prisons.174
Yet, in actuality, the shocking, dangerous, and
Gradual Retreat to the “Hands-Off” Doctrine?, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 219, 220
(1993).
166. Robertson, supra note 41, at 100 (footnotes omitted).
167. See Giles, supra note 165, at 222 (citing Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546,
546 (1964) (“[T]he Court [has] recognized that inmates retain certain
constitutional rights and privileges and may seek redress in court for their
unlawful deprivation.”); Miness, supra note 82, at 1705–06 (citing BRANHAM
& KRANTZ, SENTENCING, CORRECTIONS, AND PRISONERS’ RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL
129–30 (4th ed. 1994)).
168. Miness, supra note 82, at 1707 (citing BRANHAM & KRANTZ,
SENTENCING, CORRECTIONS, AND PRISONERS’ RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 132 (4th ed.
1994)).
169. See, e.g., Clements v. Turner, 364 F. Supp. 270, 277 (D. Utah 1973).
170. See id.
171. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 408 (1989); Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987).
172. See, e.g., Lawson v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 502, 509–10 (11th Cir. 1996);
Corby v. Conboy, 457 F.2d 251, 254 (2d Cir. 1972).
173. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349, 354 (1981).
174. See id.
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merciless conditions in prisons that frequently violate the
prisoners’ rights have been forced upon judicial notice by prison
riots brought about by inmates fighting for their rights and the
occasional public interest story, discussing the conditions
prisoners live under.175 By allowing too much deference—a
remnant of the “hands-off” doctrine—to affect decisions on
inmates’ constitutional challenges, the courts are enabling any
anti-inmate animus to form the basis of regulations that threaten
prisoner rights.
2.

Animus Towards and Political Weakness of Prisoners

In a strong dissenting opinion in Hudson v. Palmer, Justice
Stevens expressed that “[p]risoners are truly the outcasts of
society. Disenfranchised, scorned and feared[,] . . . [they are] shut
away from public view, prisoners are surely a ‘discrete and insular
minority.’”176 The institutionalization of prisons brought with it
the “practice of ‘civil death,’” which consisted of penalizing
convicted offenders with a set of criminal penalties that included,
among other things, the revocation of voting rights.177 This
practice of a “civil death” still exists today for the vast majority of
prisoners. Currently, only two states allow imprisoned felons to
vote.178 All of the other states prevent felons who are currently
serving a sentence from voting.179 As of 2014, 5.85 million
Americans were prohibited from voting because they had been
convicted of a felony.180 Some states restrict voting rights of a

175. See id. at 354 (citing Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360
F. Supp. 676, 684 (Mass. 1973)).
176. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 557 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 222 n.7 (1984)) (advocating a more
thorough judicial review of prisoners claims, asserting that the presumption
that all conduct by prison guards is reasonable is unsupported).
177. See JEAN CHUNG, SENT’G PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT: A
PRIMER 2 (2013), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_Felony
%20Disenfranchisement%20Primer.pdf.
178. See id. at 1 (noting that Maine and Vermont do not restrict prisoners’
voting rights even if they have a felony conviction).
179. See id. at 1 tbl. 1 (providing a chart dictating how long felons are
prevented from voting in each state).
180. Id. at. 1 & tbl. 1 (noting that the 5.85 million disenfranchised felons
include both those currently incarcerated for committing felonies and citizens
that had been convicted of felonies and released but had permanently lost
their right to vote).
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convicted felon even after he or she has served his or her sentence
and is no longer on probation or parole.181
Thus, many
imprisoned felons, and many free people who have experienced
prison life, are currently disenfranchised. This disfranchisement
greatly weakens the political power and voice of prisoners.182
Prisoners get little to no protection from the political processes;
they lack an organized or even a largely enfranchised
constituency.183
Prisoners must rely on federal courts for
protection of their constitutional rights, as the judiciary is the only
branch of the federal government that is not elected.184
In America, prisoners are one of the only groups that are still
acceptable, perhaps even politically correct, to hate.185
Politicians, who are often responsible for making and
implementing the conditions in prisons, compete to be the
toughest on crime. Moreover, politicians repeatedly advocate laws
that restrict prisoners’ rights.186
Prisoners face—and have
historically faced—extreme negative animus in the community as
well.187 For example, citizens frequently fight against allowing
halfway
houses
or
rehabilitation
facilities
in
their
neighborhoods.188 Citizens claim that they do not want a criminal
element near communities comprised of free citizens, even though
these institutions can greatly help prisoners.189 Clearly, the
mindset that prisoners “deserve what they get” by virtue of
committing the crime they were convicted of is not gone from
modern society.
When a group is politically insular and/or powerless, courts
should look closely at whether the government interest that the
181. See id. at 1 tbl. 1.
182. See id. at 5.
183. See Robertson, supra note 151, at 203–04.
184. See id.
185. See Aukerman, supra note 142, at 18–19.
186. See id.
187. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 557 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also CHRISTOPHER SMITH,
COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 288 (1993) (“Incarcerated
criminal offenders constitute a despised minority without political power to
influence the policies of legislative and executive officials.”); Robertson, supra
note 151, at 203.
188. See, e.g., Cmty. Res. for Justice, Inc. v. City of Manchester, 949 A.2d
681, 684 (N.H. 2008).
189. See id.
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policymakers use to justify the regulation is in fact rationally
related to the regulation. Heightened rational basis review is
particularly important because an insular group is not in the
majority and may not be integrated into society. This factor has
helped lead courts to categorize a particular group as suspect and
apply strict scrutiny.190 Prisoners are particularly insular as they
are physically separated from the rest of society by the bars on
their cells. Thus, they deserve a close review into whether the
government interests are, in fact, reasonable.
Prisoners have many characteristics consistent with suspect
classes and quasi-suspect classes. Yet, courts do not acknowledge
prisoners as a suspect or quasi-suspect class. I do not argue that
prisoners’ challenges should be given intermediate or strict
scrutiny, as the Court has refused to grant prisoners this level of
review. The fact that the Court does not consider prisoners to be a
suspect or quasi-suspect class does not negate all of the
characteristics that prisoners share with suspect and quasisuspect classes.
The fact that prisoners share so many
characteristics with these vulnerable classes points to the need to
afford prisoners the most stringent strand of rational basis review
available to courts.
B. Fundamental Rights
1.

Prisoners Retain Rights

As the Court stated in Turner, “Prison walls do not form a
barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the
Constitution.”191 Further, the Court has also stated that “a prison
inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not
inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate
penological objectives of the correctional system.”192 Prisoners
retain the basic civil right to read and stay informed with national
events. Prisons throughout the country recognize this right.193
The Federal Bureau of Prisons expressly recognizes the right to
read and stay informed by ensuring via regulation that each
190. See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 533–35. But see San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
191. 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1986).
192. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
193. See Burns, supra note 97, at 1266 n.254.
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prison provides a library service stocked with a wide variety of
reading materials to which inmates regularly have access.194
2.

The Right to Read is A Fundamental Right

The free segments of the population possess a right to read.195
The United States Constitution states “Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”196
Nevertheless, it is understood that the First Amendment grants
rights that are not specifically enumerated in the words of the
First Amendment.197 “[T]he Supreme Court has ruled that
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
containing implied rights.”198 While the rights implied from the
penumbra of the Bill of Rights are not expressly in the
Constitution, or within the First Amendment, they are necessary
to give full meaning, life, and substance to the express guarantees
of the Amendments.199 One of these implied rights is the right to
read.200
194. See 28 C.F.R. § 544.100 (2014).
195. See Stanley Wu, Note, Persona Non Grata in the Courts: The
Disappearance of Prisoners’ First Amendment Constitutional Rights in Beard
v. Banks, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 981, 981, 989 (2007).
196. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
197. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v.
Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866–67 (1982); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482
(1965); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
198. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (4th ed. Supp. 2011) (defining a
“penumbra” as “[a] surrounding area or periphery of uncertain extent”). The
clauses of the First Amendment are among the specific guarantees of the Bill
of Rights that have a penumbra. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482–84.
199. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482–84.
200. See id. at 482 (citing Martin, 319 U.S. at 143). Freedom of speech
and the penumbra of rights it encompasses are among the fundamental
rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from infringement or
constitutional abridgment by the states. See id. at 488, 499 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring); see also Schneider v. New State, 308 U.S. 147, 150–51 (1939)
(“This court has characterized the freedom of speech and that of the press as
fundamental personal rights and liberties. The phrase is not an empty one
and was not lightly used. It reflects the belief of the framers of the
Constitution that exercise of the rights lies at the foundation of free
government by free men.”) (footnote omitted); Smith v. Wash. State Dep’t of
Corr., No. C13-5138 RBL-JRC, 2014 WL 813703, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 3,
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The Supreme Court has long recognized that the First
Amendment includes the right to read.201 In Martin v. City of
Struthers, the Court stated:
The authors of the First Amendment knew that novel and
unconventional ideas might disturb the complacent, but
they chose to encourage a freedom [,] which they believed
essential if vigorous enlightenment was ever to triumph
over slothful ignorance. This freedom embraces the right
to distribute literature, and necessarily protects the right
to receive it.202
In addition, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court acknowledged
that:
[T]he State may not, consistently with the spirit of the
First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available
knowledge. The right of freedom of speech and press
includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the
right to distribute, the right to receive, [and] the right to
read.203
What would be the point of being able to talk or write freely if no
one could hear what you said or read what you wrote?204 In my
opinion, such a restriction would turn our fundamental First
Amendment freedoms into empty rights.
More directly to the issue, in Stanley v. Georgia, the Court
held that a state could not criminalize the private possession of
obscene material by a consenting adult because every person has a
vested interest in being able to read and receive information and
ideas freely.205 The Court stated that “[i]f the First Amendment
2014) (“Prison inmates have a First Amendment right to send and receive
mail. This right applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.”)
(citations omitted).
201. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482; Martin, 319 U.S. at 143.
202. 319 U.S. at 143 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
203. 381 U.S. at 482 (emphasis added) (citing Martin, 319 U.S. at 143).
204. See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (“It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only
sellers and no buyers.”).
205. 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969). Later cases have held that the mere
possession of child pornography is an exception to this rule because “the
interests underlying child pornography prohibitions far exceed the interests
justifying the Georgia Law at issue in Stanley.” Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S.
103, 108 (1990).
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means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a
man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or
what films he may watch.”206 The reasoning of Stanley is
trumpeted in Justice Marshall’s dissent to a prisoners’ rights case
where he explained, the fact “[t]hat individuals have a
fundamental First Amendment right to receive information and
ideas is beyond dispute.”207 The Court has long recognized that
the right to read and receive information and ideas, regardless of
their social worth, is fundamental to the free American society:208
“Freedom to distribute information to every citizen wherever he
desires to receive it is so clearly vital to the preservation of a free
society that . . . it must be fully preserved.”209
Typically, the courts review any regulation or policy that
threatens a fundamental right with strict scrutiny.210 As Justice
Brennan said in his concurrence in Lamont v. Postmaster General
of the United States: “In the area of First Amendment freedoms,
government has the duty to confine itself to the least intrusive
regulations which are adequate for the purpose.”211 When a
prisoner claims his fundamental rights have been violated, the
courts subject the claim to the Turner test, and refuse to review
the claim with heighted scrutiny.212 However, similar restrictions
on a free citizen’s fundamental right to read would trigger
heightened scrutiny.213 While the Court acknowledges, to some
206. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565.
207. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 572–73 (1979) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
208. See, e.g., Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486–87
(Goldberg, J., concurring).
209. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146–47 (1943).
210. See, e.g., Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 1000
(7th Cir. 2006) (“Heightened scrutiny . . . is appropriate when government
action interferes with a person’s fundamental rights, such as freedom of
speech or religion.”); Ulrika Ekman Ault, Note, The FBI’s Library Awareness
Program: Is Big Brother Reading Over Your Shoulder?, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1532, 1539 (1990).
211. 381 U.S. 301, 310 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring).
212. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87–91 (1987); see also Sharon
Dolovich, Forms of Deference in Prison Law, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 245, 254
(2012) (“In the prisoners’ rights context, there is an obvious tension between
the Turner test, which if not identical to rational basis review is certainly a
species of it, and the fact that in many cases, it is prisoners’ fundamental
rights—ordinarily afforded heightened scrutiny—that are at issue.”).
213. See Pepe, supra note 150, at 72 (“With respect to burdens of
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extent, that the Government has the duty to confine itself to the
least intrusive regulations when First Amendment rights are
threatened within prison walls, the Court still applies rational
basis review to determine the constitutionality of the statutes,
regulations, or prison policies.214 As one scholar has argued, the
first factor of the Turner test, rationality, actually acts as a
“leveler of rights by drawing no distinction between [prisoners’]
‘weak’ (non-fundamental) and ‘strong’ (fundamental) rights.”215
Reading habits correlate with being an active participant in
one’s community and foster the free flow of ideas.216 These
benefits are key to democratic functioning and can aid in the
penological objective of rehabilitation by keeping a prisoner’s mind
engaged.217
One Federal Communications Commissioner
expressed the importance of the free flow of ideas to the core of our
democracy: “We have to secure our legacy as Americans—the free
flow of ideas and information that was at the very foundation of
our country.”218 Prison officials cite the penological goal of
rehabilitation to justify prison censorship.219 However, reading
helps engage prisoners’ minds and fosters a free flow of ideas.220
Furthermore, reading promotes active engagement in the
community.221 Thus, reading can actually serve rehabilitative
ends.222
prisoners’ fundamental rights, the Court has crafted an intermediate
standard of review.”); Eric Rieder, Note, The Right of Self-Representation in
the Capital Case, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 130, 135–36 (1985) (addressing, in part,
that the right to self-representation is a fundamental right). Yet, under this
supposed intermediate standard, “[g]overnment action that burdens
prisoners’ fundamental rights fails . . . unless it is reasonably related to a
legitimate penological interest.” Pepe, supra note 150, at 72. This standard
is eerily similar to rational basis review, especially considering the level of
deference given to the government. See Dolovich, supra note 212, at 254.
214. See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 531–32 (2006); Turner, 482
U.S. at 87.
215. Robertson, supra note 41, at 120.
216. See BANNED BOOKS, supra note 19, at 5–6.
217. See id.
218. Jonathan S. Adelstein, Comm’r, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Remarks
at the National Conference for Media Reform, Minneapolis, Minnesota 3
(June 8, 2008).
219. See Burns, supra note 97, at 1256–58 & n.206.
220. See BANNED BOOKS, supra note 19, at 5–6.
221. See id. at 5.
222. See Clark v. California, 739 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1179 & n.2 (N.D. Cal.
2010).
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Since the right to read is a fundamental right, the courts
should strictly comply with the Turner test to ensure that
prisoners’ fundamental rights are not being arbitrarily violated.
The Turner test stands for rational basis review, but there is
nothing preventing the courts from looking deeper into the Turner
factors to ensure that the regulations and decisions are actually
reasonable. The courts ought to analyze each factor much more
closely; it is absurd that they do not, as an enhanced rational basis
review is what the test calls for on its face.
IV. RATIONAL BASIS WITH A BITE

The current application of the Turner test does not work.
Prisoners’ challenges are not adequately reviewed. Prisoners need
extra protection because reading rights are fundamental rights,
and prisoners are a class with many characteristics that define
suspect and/or quasi-suspect classes. The Court refuses to review
prisoners’ First Amendment rights challenges with intermediate
or strict scrutiny. Accordingly, I suggest that an enhanced
rational basis review be applied to prisoners’ First Amendment
rights challenges.
Three levels of scrutiny purportedly exist, including rational
basis review, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.223 In
some cases, the Court seems to add teeth to its rational basis
review, causing it to become a meaningful hurdle to overcome.224
The Court has applied this heightened rational basis review,
“rational basis with a bite,” when considering laws that
disadvantage certain classes of people.225 While the Court has
223. See Calvert & Hayes, supra note 115, at 13, 21–22; Susannah W.
Pollvogt, Beyond Suspect Classifications, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 739, 743
(2014) (arguing that the level of scrutiny courts apply can often be outcome
determinative). Under rational basis review, the courts will uphold the law
at issue only if it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.
See Pollvogt, supra note 223, at 743. When using intermediate scrutiny, the
courts will uphold the law at issue only if it is substantially related to an
important government interest. See id. at 744. When the court is using strict
scrutiny, it will uphold the law at issue only if it was enacted for a compelling
government interest, is narrowly tailored, and the least restrictive means to
achieve the compelling interest. See id.
224. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634–35 (1996); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 533–34 (1973).
225. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442–
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never expressly acknowledged such a standard of review, “rational
basis with a bite” occurs when the Court, purportedly using
traditional rational basis review, searches for an actual, rational
connection between a regulation, statute, or policy and a
legitimate governmental interest.226
Despite the fact that
“rational basis with a bite” exists, prisoners’ fundamental rights
claims are currently subjected to one of the least effectual and
most deferential forms of rational basis review.227
A. Traditional Rational Basis Review
Courts are more deferential to the government’s purported
objectives under rational basis review than under strict scrutiny
review.228 The traditional rational basis review utilized today is
very similar to the standard set forth by the Court in 1911.229
Under rational basis review, the court will uphold the law at issue
only if it is rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose.230 “When [a] classification . . . is called in question, if
any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain
it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was
enacted must be assumed.”231 Clearly, the conventional wisdom
is, when using this form of rational basis review, virtually any
regulation will be deemed rational.232

47 (1985) (the class of people with intellectual disabilities); Moreno, 413 U.S.
at 533–35 (the “hippie” class). Rational basis with a bite review is
unnecessary when a law threatens a class that the Court has expressly
recognized as either a quasi-suspect or suspect class, because those classes
are entitled to intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny, respectively. See
Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis With Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny
By Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 793 (1987) (arguing that rational basis
with a bite review is merely the Court’s use of the intermediate scrutiny
standard, despite declining to recognize a class as quasi-suspect).
226. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; Romer, 517 U.S. at 634–35;
Moreno, 413 U.S. at 533–34.
227. See Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 531–32 (2006); Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 87 (1987); see also Calvert & Hayes, supra note 115, at 44.
228. See SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 113, at 602.
229. See Lindsley v. Nat. Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
230. See Pollvogt, supra note 223, at 743.
231. Lindsley, 220 U.S. at 78.
232. See Aukerman, supra note 142, at 3; Daniel Farber & Suzanna
Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 262 (1996) (“[W]e all
teach our students, the Court never invalidates statutes unless it applies
something more than ‘real’ minimal scrutiny.”) (footnote omitted).
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Historically, the Court has stated, “[f]or protection against
abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to
the courts.”233 Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. is an early case
where the court used rational basis review.234 In this case, the
Court had no proof before it that the regulation at issue served a
legitimate government purpose; however, the Court presented
hypothetical facts that connected the regulation to a legitimate
government purpose.235 It is easy to see that traditional rational
basis review has been construed to be a very weak level of
review.236
B. Rational Basis with a Bite Review Jurisprudence
In United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, the
Court applied “rational basis with a bite” review to invalidate a
law that disadvantaged hippies.237 Despite the fact that the
government attempted to justify the disputed regulation by
claiming an interest in: (1) “rais[ing] levels of nutrition among
low-income households” and (2) “strengthen[ing] our agricultural
economy,” the Court found the law irrelevant to these purposes.238
Thus, the Court found the law could not withstand judicial review,
stating that the law as applied was “wholly without any rational
233. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla. Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955)
(quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876)).
234. See id. at 487–91. The Court upheld a regulation that favored one
group (opticians) over another group (the sellers of ready to wear doctors).
See id. While the facts are not significant to this paper, the review the Court
gave in that case exemplifies traditional rational basis review.
235. See id. at 487, 490–91.
236. Compare Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 522, 530–32 (2006) (stating
that the courts must show “substantial deference to the professional
judgment of prison administrators” and accepting the administrators’
assertion that deprivation of access to newspapers, magazines, and
photographs was reasonably connected to the legitimate penological interest
of incentivizing better behavior), with Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487 (noting
that the regulation at issue “may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in
many cases,” but then devising hypotheticals to connect the regulation to a
legitimate governmental interest and determining it “is for the legislature,
not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new
requirement”).
237. 413 U.S. 528, 529, 534, 543 (1973). The law at issue technically
disadvantaged groups of unrelated people who lived together by preventing
them from receiving food stamps. See id. at 529. However, the law did so in
a way that disadvantaged hippies. See id. at 534, 537.
238. Id. at 533–34.
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basis.”239 The court went on to note that the real reason for the
law, which was evident from the legislative history, was to
prevent hippies from receiving food stamps.240 That purpose did
not justify the restriction because laws or regulations based on
negative animus without some independent, legitimate interests
are invalid.241 Therefore, the Court proclaimed that “if the
constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest.”242 This is significant because,
inferring from Douglas’s concurrence, one could interpret the
Court’s holding to be the result of looking beyond the
government’s surface justification for the law and engaged in more
in-depth analysis than is typical for rational basis review.243
In Lawrence v. Texas, the law at issue made it a crime to
commit sodomy and, thus, prohibited male homosexual
intercourse.244 Based on Justice O’Connor’s concurrence it is clear
that she looked closely at how rarely the law was being
enforced.245 Based on this review of the law, she discerned that
the law “serve[d] more as a statement of dislike and disapproval
against homosexuals than as a tool to stop criminal behavior,” and
thus, she and the majority of the Court ruled the law was
invalid.246 In reaching this conclusion, the Court overturned
precedent and held that moral disapproval alone cannot be a
legitimate government interest that allows for a constitutional
infringement.247 In Romer v. Evans, the Court used rational basis
review but looked critically at the purported government
objectives to see if those objectives were actually being served by
239. Id. at 538.
240. Id. at 534, 537–38.
241. Id. at 534.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 543–44.
244. 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
245. See id. at 583. (O’Connor, J., concurring).
246. Id. at 583.
247. Id. at 577–78 (majority opinion); see id. at 583 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (“Moral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate
governmental interest under the Equal Protection Clause because legal
classifications must not be ‘drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the
group burdened by the law.’” (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633
(1996)).
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the amendment at issue.248 In considering an amendment to
Colorado’s State Constitution, which prevented protected status
based upon homosexuality or bisexuality, the Court ultimately
held that the amendment at issue violated the rights of
homosexual citizens because the under-and-over-inclusive nature
of the amendment revealed that the amendment was based on
negative animosity towards homosexuals.249
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center Inc., the Court
again purported to use ordinary rational basis review to determine
whether a challenged regulation required a special use permit to
operate a home for the mentally disabled.250 However, the Court
questioned whether the government’s contention “that other
people can live under such ‘crowded’ conditions when mentally
retarded persons cannot” was legitimate.251
Traditionally,
however, under rational basis review, the government does not
need to prove that its contentions were true to uphold a
questionable statute because as long as the government’s views
are possible, the court would assume that the version of the facts
that would support the government’s regulation existed.252 Yet,
while using what I and many others call “rational basis with a
bite,” the Court closely looked at the threatened class’s social,
cultural, and political history.253 Moreover, the Court reviewed
the class’s current status in society to determine if the regulation
was reasonably related to a legitimate government purpose, or
alternatively, based on negative animus for the group.254 Once
the Court determined that the mentally disabled were not an
248. 517 U.S. 620, 626, 631–33, 635 (1996).
249. Id. at 621, 632–34; see also SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 113, at
751.
250. 473 U.S. 432, 432 (1985). Though the ordinance at issue was not
invalid on its face, the Court ultimately held that the regulation was valid;
the regulation was invalidly applied in this case because the denial of the
special use permit was not rationally related to the government interests that
the city presented. See id.
251. Id. at. 450 (quoting Cleburne Living Ctr. v. City of Cleburne, 726
F.2d 191, 202 (1984)).
252. See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 522, 531–32 (2006) (accepting
the prison officials’ contentions without any supporting proof that the
regulation actually served the purpose); Lindsley v. Nat. Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
253. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 432, 438, 446–48, 450, 453–55.
254. Id. at 442–47.
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appropriate class for heightened scrutiny, the Court still looked
critically at each justification the government put forth to see if
the denial of the special use permit was rational.255 Ultimately,
the Court determined that the denial was not rational.256
The cases above demonstrate that under a certain line of case
law, courts, purportedly acting under rational basis review, gave
regulations at issue an enhanced review. The courts reviewed
beyond the government’s bare assertion of why the regulation at
issue was appropriate; the courts did this rather than accepting
the lawmakers’ justification at face value. The Court did not
accept the lawmakers’ justifications at face value under “rational
basis with a bite,” simply because a set of facts can be reasonably
conceived to sustain the law or policy at issue; the existence of
those facts, at the time the law was enacted, are not presumed.257
Under rational basis review a court would accept any conceivable
justification for a law or statute, but under “rational basis with a
bite” as demonstrated above the courts actually look into the
credibility of the justification.
C. Prisoners Reading Rights Are Entitled to “Rational Basis with
a Bite”
Prisoners’ reading rights are exactly the type of rights that
deserve heightened scrutiny. The courts need to apply a heighted
form of rational basis review when considering the
constitutionality of restrictions that infringe upon prisoners’
fundamental reading rights. Further, regardless of the right at
issue, prisoners as a group have many characteristics that are
indicative of a suspect or a quasi-suspect class.258 Therefore, the
courts should look closely at restrictions that disadvantage
prisoners. Also, Turner itself lays out something more than the
pure rational basis test, as the Turner test sets forth that when
reviewing prisoners’ claims, courts should look at the rational
basis test and three other factors in order to determine if a

255. Id. at 446, 448–50.
256. Id. at 448, 450.
257. See Beard, 548 U.S. at 522–23 (2006); see also U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973).
258. See Aukerman, supra note 142, at 51–56 (comparing characteristics
of former prisoners and groups classified as suspect).
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challenged regulation or policy is reasonable.259
The standard derived from Turner calls for courts to consider
whether “prison regulation[s] that [burden] fundamental rights
[are] ‘reasonably related’ to legitimate penological objectives, or
whether it represents an ‘exaggerated response’ to those
concerns.”260 The current application of the Turner test is every
bit as toothless as Justice Stevens warned that it would be in his
dissent, due at least in part to the extraordinary deference
afforded to prison administrators.261 Though this standard seems
to call for a slightly heightened form of review, in practice, the
Turner test is clearly used as a weak strand of rational basis
review.262
Prisoners are disenfranchised, politically weak, and
unpopular. The policies infringing upon the fundamental reading
rights of prisoners are overinclusive as they prevent individuals,
without any individualized assessment, from receiving
publications. It is my opinion that the publications in most, if not
all, prisoners’ hands would not compromise institutional security
or rehabilitative goals.
However, because people must be
convicted of a crime in order to become initiated into the class,
courts have been unwilling to apply heightened scrutiny.263
Prisoners have many of the qualities that traditionally encouraged
courts to review other classes’ constitutional challenges using the
somewhat heightened rational basis with a bite test.264 Prisoners
numerically make up a significant minority within the American
society, and we should stand up and ensure that any infringement
on prisoners’ rights is only committed when necessary to further
259. 482 U.S. 78, 89–90 (1987) (listing the other three factors as: (1)
whether there are alternative means of exercising that right; (2) the impact
accommodation of the right will have on guards, other inmates, and the
allocation of prison resources; and (3) absence of ready alternatives to the
regulation).
260. Id. at 87.
261. See id. at 100–01 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Application of [this]
standard would seem to permit disregard for inmates’ constitutional rights
whenever the imagination of the warden produces a plausible security
concern and a deferential trial court is able to discern a logical connection
between that concern and the challenged regulation.”).
262.
See Calvert & Murrhee, supra note 56, at 263 & n.57 (observing that
Turner established a “very relaxed form of judicial scrutiny”).
263. See Newell, supra note 153, at 71.
264. See Aukerman, supra note 142, at 52–56.
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an institution’s legitimate penological interest.265
The legislature and prison administrators are primarily
responsible for running prisons.266
They have had this
responsibility since the warden of one of the first prisons
“encouraged his guards to treat the inmates with contempt and
flogged the insane and epileptic as well as the recalcitrant.”267
The legislature and prison administrators had this responsibility
when the deplorable prison conditions around the country led to
an outbreak of prison riots.268 Clearly, the legislature and prison
administrators have historically failed in their responsibility and
duty to care for prisoners and protect the rights that prisoners
retain.269
While some infringements are necessary as a result of a
prisoner’s status as a prisoner, other infringements violate the
rights that prisoners retain despite their incarceration.270
The judiciary makes prisoners, who already suffer from an
abridgement of their constitutional rights, victims by inadequately
reviewing their constitutional challenges to regulations or polices.
As Justice Brennan declared, “[j]udicial intervention is
indispensable if constitutional dictates—not to mention
considerations of basic humanity—are to be observed in the
prisons.”271
Without judicial intervention, prisoners will
inevitably remain victims. At minimum, prisoners are entitled to
the modern “rational basis with a bite” analysis to ensure that the
policies and regulations employed in prisons are actually
rationally related to a legitimate government interest.
The judiciary endorses many prison policies affecting
265. See THOMAS P. BONCZAR & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
LIFETIME LIKELIHOOD OF GOING TO STATE OR FEDERAL PRISON 1 (1997),
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/Llgsfp.pdf (“An estimated 5.1% of all persons in
the United States will be confined in a State or Federal prison during their
lifetime, if incarceration rates recorded in 1991 remain unchanged in the
future.”); see also Brittany Bondurant, Note, The Privatization of Prisons and
Prisoner Healthcare: Addressing the Extent of Prisoners’ Right to Healthcare,
39 NEW. ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT. 407, 421 (2013).
266. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349, 354 (1981).
267. Engel & Rothman, supra note 156, at 419.
268. See Miness, supra note 82, at 1706.
269. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); Cooper v. Plate,
378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964).
270. See Pell, 417 U.S. at 822.
271. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 354 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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prisoners’ reading rights by giving such a high level of deference
to prison administrators.
Further, if this deference and,
consequently, lenient rational basis review continues, the courts
will only be perpetuating the mistreatment, anti-inmate animus,
and
curtailment of rights
that prisoners—a largely
disenfranchised class—have long faced in this country.
Prisoners are a weak and vulnerable segregated group within
American society. Still, in this country, prisoners retain all the
rights that are not inconsistent with their role as prisoners.272
Prisoners do retain some level of First Amendment rights. The
courts do not grant prisoners strict or even intermediate scrutiny
review even when their fundamental rights are violated. First
Amendment rights are fundamental rights.273 The importance of
First Amendment rights within this country is just another reason
why prisoners need to be afforded the most stringent form of
rational basis review available when prisoners’ First Amendment
rights are threatened.
CONCLUSION

In general, the banning of certain publications within prisons
makes sense. Preventing prisoners from accessing publications
that provide instructions on how to make weapons out of readily
accessible materials or provide blueprints of the institutions in
which they are incarcerated, is clearly necessary to further
legitimate penological interests. Yet, when administrators try to
prevent prisoners from receiving Arabic/English dictionaries
because it would be detrimental to the security of the institution if
the prisoners learned English, the policy is no longer justified.274
When administrators try to prevent prisoners from accessing
books by Shakespeare, Orwell, Obama, or other new award272. See Pell, 417 U.S. at 822.
273. See supra Section III.B (discussing why reading rights are
fundamental and how First Amendment issues are typically treated in regard
to free citizens).
274. Jared A. Goldstein, Distinguished Research Professor of law, was
told by the administrators of the Guantanamo Bay institution that giving his
clients access to Arabic/English dictionaries would be detrimental to the
security of the institution, and thus, the prisoners at the institution were
prohibited from receiving said dictionaries.
Interview with Jared A.
Goldstein, Distinguished Research Professor of Law, Roger Williams Univ.
Sch. of Law, in Bristol, R.I. (May 2, 2014).
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winning publications, it just is not rational. The justifications
prisons use that enable them to ban books cannot justify limitless
restrictions. It is important to ensure that that the penological
interests of our institutions are narrowly tailored. Meaning, for
example, as a society, we should not find that a publication is
detrimental to the institutional security of a prison simply for
providing a critical political allegory or a controversial idea.
The current deference awarded to the prison administrators
and the legislature is unacceptable because it prevents one out of
every hundred Americans from receiving the level of judicial
review to which they are entitled.275 Prisoners are a vulnerable
and unpopular class. Moreover, the right argued herein is a
fundamental right that is subject to the highest level of scrutiny
outside of prison doors. In order to ensure that prison policies and
regulations are not infringing on and inhibiting prisoners’ rights,
a more “biting rational basis review” is required. After all, a more
“biting” approach can be found in the Turner decision itself!276
For this review to be meaningful, courts must use a “biting” form
of rational basis when reviewing prisoners’ challenges to policies
that allegedly violate their rights.
The right to read and have open access to information is at
the foundation of the American society. If we are denying those
rights to prisoners, what are we saying about our society? We
must bear in mind the words that Winston Churchill is reputed to
have said: “[Y]ou measure the degree of civilization of a society by
how it treats its weakest members.”277

275. BONCZAR & BECK, supra note 265; see Bondurant, supra note 265, at
421.
276. See 482 U.S. 78, 89–90 (1987). If the regulations were measured
under a reasonable standard, there would be no need for additional factors,
yet those factors are included in the opinion.
277. E.g., Nicola, David Cameron Has Blood on His Hands, DAVID BOLES
BLOGS (Mar. 29, 2013), http://bolesblogs.com/2013/03/29/david-cameron-hasblood-on-his-hands/ (quoting statement of Winston Churchill).

